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Abstract 
A Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System that allows for social interactions is described 
and then estimated on CEX data. Social interactions are introduced as mean budget shares 
and depend on peer membership and visibility. Peer identification is obtained by means of a 
similarity index which measures the probability of group membership. Reflection problem 
is tackled directly and therefore estimation is carried on with a Generalized Spatial 2SLS 
that deal with two types of endogeneity: the first due to contemporaneous choices of 
households, the second due to contemporaneous choice of goods. The results support the 
hypothesis that total expenditure allocation to budget shares depends both on social 
interaction and visibility. 
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1 Introdution
People are soial animals: people do not live in isolation, almost any eonom-
ially relevant ation and hoie is taken in a partiular soial environment,
and behavior of others are likely to inuene individual ativities. Even if
this an be onsidered a ommon sense statement, traditional eonomi mod-
els of individual behavior assume that agents hoose in perfet isolation and
preferenes are not diretly inuened by the behavior of others. Neverthe-
less the idea that peer eets do matter attrated a number of eonomists in
dierent elds, that tried to inlude soial interations in models of edua-
tional attainment, job searh, rime and deviating behavior, early pregnany
and many others. Unfortunately, most of the empirial evidene is drawn
from spei datasets or natural experiments, therefore limiting the validity
of the results to partiular subpopulations.
Interdependent preferenes was onsidered also in onsumption litera-
ture: if Mr Smith buys a brand new ar to keep up with Mr Jones, this
means that Mr Smith preferenes are inuened by Mr. Jones' one. Out
of the example, the question is whether soial interations matter in on-
sumption hoies. Is it reasonable to think that at least for some goods
onsumption hoies of friends, olleagues or in general peers have a role in
individual hoies? This paper aims to shed some light on this issue.
This study is mainly empirial: there won't be a omplete harateriza-
tion of preferenes, soial interations will be introdued as a onditioning
fator in a demand system. The objetive is to assess their relevane using a
USwide survey as the Consumers' Expenditures Survey, CEX. The results
suggest that Soial Interations do matter.
The introdution of peer eets in an empirial onsumption model rises
two eonometri issues: the denition of the relevant referene group for eah
individual, and a partiular kind of endogeneity, alled reetion problem by
Manski [14℄. The estimation strategy proposed in this paper takles both
of them diretly. The idea is to use a measure of similarity to identify peer
membership and on this basis redene the demand system as a Spatial
Autoregressive Model (SAR).
Setion 2 desribes the Eonomi Model - the Quadrati Almost Ideal
Demand System (QUAIDS) proposed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbell [2℄
- the separability assumptions needed to restrit the attention to demand
systems, the inlusion of onditioning fators and how soial interations are
modelled. In setion 3 the dataset is desribed, the following one is devoted
to the estimation strategy and results. Setion 5 onludes.
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2 The Eonomi Model
The framework on whih onsumption behavior is modelled is the Life Cyle
Hypothesis (LCH) of Modigliani. This is ommon pratie in publi nane:
LCH desribes onsumers' hoies as the maximization of an expeted in-
tertemporal utility funtion under an appropriate budget onstraint. The
utility funtion depends on onsumption of durables and nondurables in
eah period and hours of work on eah period. In order to redue this gen-
eral problem to a treatable one, an intertemporal separability assumption is
needed.
To be spei, it is assumed that the objetive funtion is intertepo-
rally additive in onsumption of nondurable goods. It is well known that
this assumption implies twostage budgeting: in the rst stage households
equates the disounted marginal utility of eah period and determines to-
tal nondurables expenditures, hours of work and durables' onsumption
of eah period. In the seond stage onsumers alloate total expenditures
to eah nondurable good onditional on leisure and durables hoie of the
rst stage. This alloation proess an be desribed by means of a demand
system.
The seond key assumption is that soial interation matters only at
the seond stage. As to say, saving deisions are not aeted by others'
behavior, therefore peer group eet on onsumption is onditional on total
expenditure and enter in the demand system, yet not in the Euler equation
desribing the rststage.
While intertemporal separability is a standard assumption even if it's not
innouous (see as an example Browning, Meghir [5℄ for a disussion on labor
supply and nondurables onsumption separability), the seond one is not
and it's ruial in this paper. Binder and Pesaran [3℄ propose a theoreti
lifeyle model where soial interations' impat on optimal onsumption
depend on intertemporal onsiderations. However, they do not rule out
the possibility that soial interations matter also in total expenditure al-
loation, and even if they infer that intertemporal onsiderations should be
more relevant then stati ones, their paper is purely theoreti, so still there
is no empirial evidene on the relative importane of peer eets on sav-
ings and onsumption alloation. Further on, the seond assumption an be
substituted by the following: soial interations eets on savings and on
onsumption are separable. In this way soial interations in rst stage are
not ruled out. The key point is that whatever the assumption it is meaningful
to onentrate the attention on the demand system.
2.1 The Demand System: QUAIDS
The starting point is the Quadrati Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS)
of Banks, Blundell and Lewbell [2℄. This is a quadrati extension of the well
3
known Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer [9℄,
shares all its features plus it allows for heterogeneous Engel urves. QUAIDS
an be seen as a quadrati loal approximation of almost any demand system
that is exatly aggregable, meaning that it's linear in (funtions of) total
expenditure. Dene
I number of onsumption goods;
H number of onsumers;
m total expenditure;
wi expenditure share on good i;
pi prie of good i and p pries' vetor;
The budget share for good i by household h is
whi = αi +
I∑
j=1
γij ln pj + βi ln
[
mh
a(p)
]
+
λi
b(p)
(
ln
[
mh
a(p)
])2
(1)
where
ln a(p) = α0 +
∑I
i=1 αi ln pi +
1
2
∑I
i=1
∑I
j=1 γij ln pi ln pj
b(p) =
∏I
i=1 p
βi
i
a(p) and b(p) are prie aggregators: the former takes a translog form,
the latter a CobbDouglas. It's relevant for estimation purposes to disuss
properties and possible restritions on these prie aggregators: onditional on
a(p) and b(p) demands are linear in pries and quadrati in total expenditure.
Restritions on b(p) have to do with the rank of the demand system, whih
Lewbell [13℄ denes as the dimension of the spae spanned by its Engel
urves. Therefore, (1) has a rank lower or equal to 3. Banks, Blundell
and Lewbell [2℄ prove that in any rank 3 exatly aggregable demand system
the squared term's oeient must be prie dependent, i.e. b(p) annot
be onstant. The authors refer to Gorman (1981) where it is proved that
the maximum possible rank for any exatly aggregable demand system is
3. Therefore, there's no gain adding ubi and higher terms to the demand
equations. They also show that empirial Engel urves estimated on British
data indiates that the demand system has rank 3. Note that (1) nests
QUAIDS with onstant b(p), whih is simpler to estimate at the prie of
restriting Engel urves' shape. This latter model itself nests AIDS. Blundell
et al. [4℄ obtain a good t with a QUAIDS where b(p) is set to 1 and therefore
rank is 2. In this paper the hoie is to write a general rank 3 QUAIDS with
soial interations, but then arry out the estimation setting b(p) = 11.
1
Estimation has been arried on also restriting to AIDS. Results (whih are not re-
ported) suggest that as long as the interest is in soial interations' eet, onlusions are
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2.2 Properties of Demand Systems
In order to be a demand system, (1) must respet adding up, zerohomogeneity
in p and m simultaneously, symmetry and negative semideniteness of the
Slutsky matrix of ompensated prie elastiities. All of them but for Slutsky
matrix negative semidenitness (whih therefore has to be heked expost)
an be expressed in terms of linear restritions on the parameters:
I∑
i=1
αi = 1;
I∑
i=1
γij = 0;
I∑
i=1
βi = 0;
I∑
i=1
λi = 0 (2)
I∑
j=1
γij = 0; (3)
γij = γji ∀i, j (4)
(2) implies adding up; (2) and (3) together imply zerohomogeneity. Con-
ditions (2) and (4) together imply Slutsky symmetry. Among them, if prie
aggregators were known only (4) would set rossequations restritions. This
observation will be useful for estimation: onditioning on preliminary esti-
mates of a(p) and setting b(p) = 1 it's possible to impose adding up and
homogeneity (i.e. restrition (2) and (3)) and estimate the system equation
by equation.
2.3 Demographis
With household data onsumer preferenes must be allowed to depend on in-
dividual harateristis, i.e. demographis z2 must enter (1) as onditioning
fators. Therefore the oeients αi, βi, λi an be thought as householdh
spei: they are rewritten as polynomials in z to make demographis' ef-
fet expliit. Note also that z inlude deterministi timedependent variables
(seasonal/year dummies). Then, ∀i 6= 0:
αhi = αi0 +
K∑
k=1
αikz
h
k (5)
βhi = βi0 +
K∑
k=1
βikz
h
k (6)
λhi = λi0 +
K∑
k=1
λikz
h
k (7)
qualitatively similar
2z is a K dimensional vetor, where K is the number of observable individual hara-
teristis
5
This is the most general formulation inluding demographis. The three
polynomials need not to depend on all theK elements of z: it is enough to set
apriori (or test expost) the relevant parameters equal to zero. Substituting
them in (1):
whi = αi0 +
K∑
k=1
αikz
h
k
+
I∑
j=1
γij ln pj
+ βi0 ln
[
mh
a(p, z)
]
+
K∑
k=1
βik
(
zhk ln
[
mh
a(p, z)
])
+
λi0
b(p, z)
(
ln
[
mh
a(p, z)
])2
+
K∑
k=1
λik
b(p, z)
(
zhk
(
ln
[
mh
a(p, z)
])2)
(8)
where also the prie aggregators are householddependent. Restritions
(2) must be rewritten in terms of the new parameters:
∑I
i=1 αi0 = 1;∑I
i=1 αik = 0 ∀k = 1, . . . K;∑I
i=1 γij = 0;∑I
i=1 βik = 0 ∀k = 0, . . . K;∑I
i=1 λik = 0 ∀k = 0, . . . K
(9)
2.4 Soial Interations
Soial Interations' eet is the propensity of an individual to behave in
some way varies with the prevalene of that behavior in some referene
group ontaining the individual (Manski [14℄). This denition is as broad
as possible and in a demand analysis framework it has been previously alled
preferene interdependene (Alessie, Kapteyn [1℄), meaning that onsumer's
preferenes are inuened by the behavior of others.
Manski makes three hypotheses to explain this empirial observation:
1. Endogenous eets: the propensity of an individual to behave in some
way is aeted by the behavior of the group. That is, demand of good
i of onsumer h hanges with the average demand of good i by other
people in his referene group;
2. Contextual eet: the propensity of an individual to behave in some
way is aetd by the exogenous harateristis of the group. That
is, demand for good i by household h depends on the average total
6
expenditure or on the average harateristis in z of individuals in the
referene group.
3. Correlated eets: individuals in the same group tend to behave simi-
larly beause they have similar (unobserved) individual harateristis.
Endogenous and ontextual eet are then eonomially meaningful
soial interations' eets, while orrelated eet reets an omitted variable
problem, and therefore it is a nonsoial eet.
Manski sets up a general linearinmeans model where the output y
depend linearly on the averages on the referene group of the output itself, of
the independent variables and of the unobserved attributes. The presene of
the average output variable on the righthandside of the regression equation
rises what the author alls the reetion problem, whih does not allow to
separately identify endogenous and ontextual eets. Nevertheless, in the
redued form of the model it is possible to identify a omposite parameter
apturing truly soial interations' eets separately from orrelated eets.
The aim of this paper is to detet whether or not there is any signiant
eet of soial interations on demand. To keep things as easy and tratable
as possible, the assumption is that there are no ontextual eets. In other
words the eet of the peers is fully aptured by the average demand in
the referene group. This hypothesis is somewhat unavoidable: the demand
system is linearinmeans, therefore without assuming out ontextual eet
it's possible to estimate just the redued form in whih soial eets are
aptured by just one soial eets' omposite parameter.
Now dene the mean budget share of good i for household h as
w˜hi :=
N∑
n=1
δhinw
n
i (10)
w˜hi is a weighted average of individual demands for good i, w
n
i . The
referene weights δhin apture the importane household h attahes to on-
sumption of good i by family n. Assume without loss of generality that
δhih = 0.
3
Alessie and Kapteyn [1℄ dened (10) as mean pereived budget share.
In their model the referene weights are individual parameters, as to say that
heterogeneity in preferene interdependene among agents depend on dier-
enes in the pereption of other households' demand. In this terms, it an
be interpreted as a framing problem: unobserved individual harateristis
determining referene weights lead households to measure dierently.
In this paper the assumption is that onsumers observe orretly, and
the referene weights are determined by the similarity between agents and
the visibility of good i:
3
It's just a resaling: if δhih 6= 0 the system an be written in terms of w¨
h
i = (1−δ
h
ih)w
h
i .
7
δhin = θiπ
h
n (11)
Where θi measures visibility of ommodity i and Π =
[
πhn
]
is the H×H
matrix whose elements represent pairwise similarities between households.
In this ontext similarity has no diretion, i.e. πhn ≡ π
n
h , therefore Π is
symmetri and with zeros on the diagonal.
The motivation behind similarities is peer identiation: the behavior of
onsumer n an have an impat on onsumer h's hoies only if they belong
to the same peer. A miroeonomi dataset with both diret information
about referene groups and the required detail about expenditure patterns
would provide a measure of peer membership, but unfortunately suh data
are not available. Without diret observation, the best the researher an do,
is to infer the probability that two individuals belong to the same referene
group from available information as physial residene, family harateristis,
rae, eduation and so on. The underling hypothesis is that similarity is a
valid measure of referene group membership, and therefore δhin will be high if
households h and n are likely to be in the same peer, vieversa it will be low.
Case [7℄ sets up a model where mean demand depends on physial proximity:
individuals belong to the same peer if they live in the same neighborhood.
Conley [8℄ provides tools to estimate models with generi eonomi distanes,
possibly measured with error.
The seond fator determining referene weights is visibility: it's reason-
able to think that onsumers are more about peer members' expenditure in
lothing rather than in toothpaste, i.e. soial interations eet matter more
for visible goods' demand than for nonvisible ones. There are two possible
motivations: rst, individuals may not be able to observe peer members'
onsumption of nonvisible goods as groeries or underwear. Seond, visibil-
ity may be a valuable harateristi of goods itself. Heetz [11℄ haraterizes
a lass of utility funtions that depend on onspiuousness of goods: the
idea is that onsumption has a diret eet on individual utility, but also an
indiret soial eet resulting from peers observing his hoie.
Now plugging (11) into (10)
w˜hi = θiw¯
h
i where w¯
h
i =
N∑
n
πhnw
n
i
It is possible to add soial interations in (8) as a onditioning fator
dening eah αi0 as a polynomial in w˜
h
i :
αi0 = α˜i0 +
I∑
j=1
(α˜ijθi)w¯
h
j (12)
Note it is impliitly assumed that soial interations hange interepts
but not slopes. Restritions (9) has to be modied as well:
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∑I
i=1 α˜i0 = 1;∑I
i=1 α˜ij = 0 ∀j = 1, . . . I;∑I
i=1 αik = 0 ∀k = 1, . . . K;∑I
i=1 γij = 0;∑I
i=1 βik = 0 ∀k = 0, . . . K;∑I
i=1 λik = 0 ∀k = 0, . . . K
(13)
At this point to obtain the omplete demand system unobservables uhi are
needed. Estimation will be done in a GMM framework, so no partiular dis-
tributional assumption aross goods will be done. Nevertheless unobservable
fators may have the same strutural dependene as demands (orrelated ef-
fet), therefore the h dimension of the error term will be modelled as follows:
uhi = ρ
N∑
n=1
πhnu
n
i + ǫ
h
(14)
The eonometri model to be estimated is then obtained adding (14) and
substituting (12) into (10):
whi = α˜i0 + φi1w¯
h
1 + · · · + φiIw¯
h
I
+
K∑
k=1
αikz
h
k +
I∑
j=1
γij ln pj
+ βi0 ln
[
mh
ah(p, z, w¯)
]
+
K∑
k=1
βikz
h
k ln
[
mh
ah(p, z, w¯)
]
+
λi0
bh(p, z)
(
ln
[
mh
ah(p, z, w¯)
])2
+
K∑
k=1
λik
bh(p, z)
zhk
(
ln
[
mh
ah(p, z, w¯)
])2
+ uhi
(15)
where φij = α˜ijθi. θi are not separately identiable from α˜i1 for all i.
This lak of identiability will ompliate interpretation: pure soial inter-
ation eet, aptured by α˜ij may well have a dierent sign and dierent
magnitude from visibility eet, θi.
The prie aggregators depend now on all the onditioning fators:
9
ln ah(p, z, w¯) = α0 +
I∑
i=1
ln pi

α˜i0 + K∑
k
αikz
h
k +
I∑
j
φijw¯
h
j


+
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
γij ln pi ln pj
(16)
bh(p) =
I∏
i=1
p
βi0+
PK
k=1 βikz
h
k
i (17)
3 The data: Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
and Consumer's Prie Index (CPI)
CEX is a detailed survey on individual expenditures. There are quarterly
data from 1980 until 2002 on approximately 600 onsumption ategories.
This survey is issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistis, that is the Oe
whih publishes the CPI prie indexes. The long and detailed repeated ross
setions dataset under analysis is obtained merging together CPI pries and
CEX expenditures. CEX provides also a large number of demographi details
about individuals, but as pointed out in the previous setion there are no
diret questions about referene groups. The laim is that the information
is adequate to ompute similarities among individuals.
In partiular, 10 years of data are onsidered - from 1993 until 2002 -
sine in this period the state of residene identier is available. For non
dislosure problems the variable STATE is suppressed for some observa-
tions in a subset of states and it is suppressed for all the observations on
some other states. All the observations from those states are dropped, so
we are left with observations from Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connetiut, Distrit of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and
Washington. The heterogeneous distribution of those states aross US still
allows to draw populationwide inferene (see gure 1).
Data are summed up at yearly level, and only households with four on-
seutive quarterly observations are onsidered. At the end the sample on-
sists of 14,272 observations. In the appendix means and standard deviations
are reported for a set of relevant demographis on the seleted subsample
and on the USwide sample. Dierenes suggest the sample is representative
for the US population.
10
Figure 1: seleted States are darkblue
4 Estimation Strategy
The estimation strategy is based on the one that Banks and Blundell [2℄ and
Blundell et al. [4℄ used. However, an extension is needed in order to deal
with the reetion problem. The estimation is divided into three steps:
1. Π Matrix estimation: similarities are measured on the basis of a set of
geographial and demographi individual harateristis.
2. Equationbyequation estimates: parameters on eah equation are es-
timated after imposing addingup and homogeneity restritions (13)
and (3). Using the Generalized Spatial 2SLS (GS2SLS) proedure of
Kelejian and Pruha [12℄ the reetion problem is taken into proper
aount. GS2SLS estimator is a GMM spatial estimator within the
lass dened by Conley [8℄. The author proves that as long as esti-
mates in step1 are impreise measurements of true group membership
probabilities, but they are not mismeasurement, step2 estimates are
onsistent
4
.
3. Restrited system estimation: a Minimum Distane estimator is ap-
plied to step2 estimates of parameters to impose rossequation re-
stritions (4).
4
An impreise measure is a measure that is orret up to a ertain level, as homework
plae traveling distanes up to ity detail but not beyond. A mismeasurement is a truly
inorret distane, as a transformation applied to true distanes
11
4.1 Similarity Matrix estimation
The laim is that two individuals are likely to belong to the same peer and
therefore possibly inuene eah others' hoies if they live lose, they are
observed in two nottoodistant points in time and they share some house-
hold's harateristis. Further on, a short physial distane is onsidered a
prerequisite for peer membership.
Given these assumptions similarity between agents h and n, dhn ≡ d
n
h,
follows a lexiographi order and it is omputed as follows:
1. if h = n, then dnn = 0 (as previously explained, this is just a re-
parametrization);
2. if h and n live in dierent States, or in two ities with dierent popu-
lation size then dhn = 0;
3. if h is observed before 1997 and n after this date, again dhn = 0.
4. if h and n live in the same maroregion in two ities with the same
populationsize and ondition 3 is false, dhn is equal to a mathing
similarity measure onstruted as follows:
• A set of 0/1 dummy variables is reated starting from the fol-
lowing variables: Family omposition, 5 yearswide age lass of
household head, rae, marital status, origin (anestry) of house-
hold head, highest eduational attainment, presene of hildren
younger than 18 in the family, gender.
• the index is equal to
dhn =
∑
11 mathes
# of 0/1 dummies
This proedure provide an estimate of similarities that is by onstru-
tion impreise: the physial distane information are quite poor if ompared
with other datasets used in soialinterations empirial literature (eg Topa
[15℄). The mathing similarity identies individuals living in two equally big
ities (possibly the same ity) in the same State. Note also that mathing
similarities are onsidered as exogenous and given in the suessive steps of
the proedure.
In order to hek that these similarities didn't simply apture State, pop-
ulation size and year eets, an OLS regression of πhn on the full set of year,
state and population dummies, plus their interations is run. Results
5
shows
that interations' parameters are signiantly dierent from zero, suggesting
that similarities are more informative than a simple set of dummies.
5
whih are not reported but are available upon request
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4.2 EquationbyEquation estimation
The demand system is nonlinear, but eah equation in (15) is linear ondi-
tional on a(p, z) and b(p, z). The seond step uses this onditional linearity
to estimate the model without imposing the rossequation restritions (4)
but allowing for withinequation ones (13) and (3). a(p, z) is approximated
with an householdlevel Stone prie Index. b(p, z) is set equal to 1. As
already explained this hoie redues the rank of the demand system to 2
aording to Lewbell's denition.
Two endogeneity issues have to be addressed: rst, total expenditure
lnmh and (lnmh)2 are endogenous along the i dimension, i.e. they are
endogenous due to the ontemporaneous alloation of total expenditure to
dierent goods by eah household. Seond, in eah equation desribing the
budget share of good i, mean budget share w¯hi is endogenous along the h di-
mension, meaning it's endogenous due to the ontemporaneous hoie of the
H households of eah good. These issues an be solved using a proper Instru-
mental Variables' proedure: endogeneity of total expenditure an be treated
with standard 2SLS, the Generalized Spatial 2SLS (GS2SLS) proposed by
Kelejian and Pruha [12℄ is needed to aount for endogeneity of mean bud-
get shares. The resulting proedure requires that lnmh and (lnmh)2 are
regressed on the exogenous variables and their predited values are used as
instruments. Then GS2SLS is applied instead of the standard seond step to
aount for endogeneity of w¯hi . GS2SLS is itself an iterative proedure. To
see the basi steps and to underline the fat that endogeneity is along the h
dimension, rewrite demand for good i (15) in matrix notation:
whi = X
hβ + φiΠw
h
i + u
h
i
uhi = ρΠu
h + ǫhi
(18)
This is written as a spatial autoregressive model, where wh is the H × 1
vetor of observation on expenditure share on good i; Xh is the H × K∗
matrix that ontains observations on the exogenous variables in Zh, the
predited values of total expenditure and squared total expenditure, pries,
w¯hj , ∀j 6= i
6
and iterations among Zh and predited values for lnmh and
(lnmh)2. Π is treated as a H ×H matrix of known onstants, ρ and φi are
salar spatial autoregressive parameters.
Now rewriting model (18) as
7
wi = Dη + ui
ui = ρΠui + ǫi
(19)
6
All the mean budget shares w¯hj ∀j 6= i are onsidered as exogenous in ith budget
share equation. Therefore the set of variables in Xh hanges for eah equation. The
overall set of regressors doesn't hange preserving adding up, sine in the ith equation w¯hi
is instrumented.
7
indexes h are omitted
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where D = (X,Πwi), η = (β
′, φi)
′
, ǫ ∼ IID(0, σ2). The model an
furthermore be transformed into
w∗i (ρ) = D
∗(ρ)η + ǫi (20)
wherew∗i (ρ) = wi−φiΠwi, D
∗(ρ) = D−ρΠD. The estimation proedure
is based on three steps:
• ompute a 2SLS estimator for η in (19), ηˆ, using as instruments for
Πwi the matrix (X,ΠX);
• use ηˆ to estimate ρˆ and σˆ2 with GMM8
• use ρˆ and σˆ2 to ompute ηKP , a feasible 2SLS of η in (20) and its
varianeovariane matrix Vˆ (ηKP )
As already noted Conley [8℄ proves that if Π is an impreise but non
mismeasured matrix of similarities GS2SLS lead to onsistent estimates.
Therefore, using it as a seond step in the overall proedure both endo-
geneities are taken into aount and ηKP is onsistent.
The system is estimated for 8 onsumption ategories: Alohol at home
(ALH), Alohol out (ALO), Food at Home (FDH), Food out (FDO), Clothing
exluding underwear (CLO), Underwear (UND), Motor Fuel (GAS), other
non durables (OTH). Some of those onsumption ategories have a relevant
presene of zero expenditures among the 14,242 observations:
zero ouranes
freq. per.
ALH 6,497 45.52
ALO 6,505 45.58
FDH 6 0.04
FDO 740 5.18
CLO 1,097 7.69
UND 2,798 19.60
GAS 964 6.75
OTH 2 0.01
Given the type of aggregates hosen, these zero ouranes are likely to
orrespond to purhase infrequeny
9
. As pointed out by Blundell et al. [4℄
it means that there is a oneptual dierene between onsumption and ex-
penditure: the latter is not simply the empirially measured ounterpart of
the former. This dierene aets both the dependent variables in the de-
mand system and total onsumption, arising a potential measurement error
8
details on moment onditions are in Kelejian and Pruha [12℄
9
There may be undeteted data quality problems: the under garments gure seems
unreasonable given that data are yearlevel aggregates.
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problem due to omitted variables. Nevertheless the estimation proedure
removes the issue: budget shares are all treated as endogenous and therefore
total expenditure is instrumented.
But for gasoline and other goods, the other onsumption aggregates are
hosen to hek whether soial interations have dierent marginal eets on
goods with a dierent visibility. Alohol demand is maintained despite the
partiularly high zero ourenes beause of its relevane from a tax poliy
point of view. OTH is omitted from the estimation to satisfy addingup.
Pries are monthly USwide prie indexes series for eah ategory (OTH
prie is the overall prie index) referring to the last month of eah yearly ob-
servation. Base year is 2000. All indexes are then divided by OTH prie to
impose homogeneity. Beause of twostage budgeting hypothesis oupation
is not instrumented: jobmarket partiipation is onsidered nonseparable
from overall onsumption in the rst stage, but when households have to de-
ide about onsumption alloation the jobmarket deision is already taken,
and therefore it's predetermined with respet to budget shares' alloation.
The same reasoning goes through for durables. The next table reports esti-
mates for own mean budget shares parameters for the rst six onsumption
ategories:
Visible goods Non visible goods
FDO φFDO 0.1657 FDH φFDH 0.0819
FDO std.err 0.019 FDH std.err 0.060
FDO tstat 8.71 FDH tstat 1.37
ALO φALO -0.0244 ALH φALH -0.0050
ALO std.err 0.008 ALH std.err 0.008
ALO tstat -2.90 ALH tstat -0.61
CLO φCLO -0.1068 UND φUND -0.4177
CLO std.err 0.027 UND std.err 0.032
CLO tstat -3.98 UND tstat -13.13
Estimated parameters are generally signiantly dierent from 0, and
they varies signiantly aross dierent types of goods and between visible
and nonvisible goods of the same type. Parameters are not marginal eets,
sine also the prie aggregator a(p) depend on φ. Nevertheless, the orretion
in marginal eets is small:
Marginal eets
FDO 0.16714 FDH 0.08800
ALO -0.02668 ALH -0.00570
CLO -0.10743 UND -0.42329
The main result of this paper is the signiane of 5 out of 6 parameters
reported in the previous tables
10
: soial interation and visibility together
10
6 out of 7 onsidering the gasoline equation
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do matter in onsumption hoies. Visibility itself seems to be relevant:
estimates are dierent within ouples ALH/ALO, FDH/FDO, CLO/UND
11
.
Food Out has a parameter twie the Food at Home one, intuitively a less
visible ategory. In this ase ommonsense is supported by previous results
by Heetz [11℄, who ranked the same aggregates in terms of visibility. Alohol
at home is not signiant, while alohol out beomes signiant and negative.
The sign ould depend on a stigma attahed to alhohol onsumption due, as
an example, to bad health eets: in this ase, the soial interations eet
in this ase is negative. Dierene in signiane is oherent with the stigma
interpretation: a person ould be onvined to buy less drinks in publi while
the less visible expenditure for alohol at home may well not depend by the
negative soial interation eet
12
.
By visibility onsiderations it makes sense that the soial interations pa-
rameter is lower for underwear rather than for lothing. Anyway in this ase
interpretation of the sign is not straightforward: a reasonable prior seems to
be that soial interations have positive eets on apparel expenditure.
The magnitude of ρ's estimates, the spatial autoregressive parameters
on unobservables, suggests that the spatial orretion on u is meaningful as
well:
ρˆ, spaial autoregressive parameter
CLO 0.01706 UND 0.02954
FDO 0.02373 FDH 0.02617
ALO 0.01800 ALH 0.01848
It's interesting to see that but for the apparel ones there isn't muh
dierene aross goods of the same type in ρ's estimates: this result together
with the sign on φ parameters on apparel suggest that on those onsumption
ategories there may be some unmodelled eet. Complete estimation results
an be found in the appendix.
4.3 Minimum Distane estimation
The nal step onsists in applying a minimum distane estimator to the
previously obtained ηKP . The rossequation restritions (Slutsky matrix
symmetry) an be expressed as
η − Sθ = 0 (21)
11
Pairs of onsumption ategories are similar but for visibility, but it annot be tested
whether dierenes in φ are due only to visibility
12
Note that Heetz [11℄ ranks ALH as more visible than ALO. Lak of a full preferenes'
haraterization leave spae to alternative interpretations of the results
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Where η is an r × 1 dimensional vetor while θ is q × 1, with r > q.
Symmetry restritions are all linear. As in GMM estimation, to impose
those restritions OMD hooses θOMD as to minimize
Q(θ) = [ηKP − Sθ]
′Vˆ (ηKP )
−1[ηKP − Sθ] (22)
The three steps proedure has an impliit assumption on the param-
eters' spae at the equationbyequation estimation step: parameters on
dierent equations are assumed to be unorrelated, therefore V (ηKP ) is
blokdiagonal. Crossequation restritions refer only to pries' parameters
γij , this implies that but for γˆij equationbyequation estimates and their
standard errors are the nal estimates. Therefore, onsidering only the seven
onsumption ategories (remember OTH is omitted for addingup), r = 49
while q = 28, the number of unique elements of a 7 × 7 symmetri matrix.
Further on, γij do not depend on w˜
h
i , therefore also the marginal eets on
mean budget shares are unhanged after OMD estimation.
The minimized value of the objetive funtion, Q(θOMD) is asymptoti-
ally distributed as a entral χ2 with r − q degrees of freedom. This pro-
vides a test for Slutsky symmetry
13
. The test rejets Slutsky symmetry
(Q(θOMD) = 40143.76). Given the linearity of (21) the estimate of Covari-
ane matrix of OMD is:
Vˆ (θOMD) = H
(
S′Vˆ (ηKP )
−1S
)
−1
(23)
Where H = 14272 is the sample size. As for the unrestrited estimates,
most of θˆij are nonsigniant. Complete restrited estimates of pries'
parameters matrix Γ = [γij ] are reported in the appendix.
5 Conlusions
The aim of this work was to assess whether onsumption hoies depend
on soial interations. To do so Soial Interations were introdued in a
Quadrati Almost Ideal Demand System as a onditioning fator. The nov-
elty of the paper is in the estimation proedure: soial interations are ap-
tured with mean budget shares, that depend on probability of peer member-
ship and visibility of eah good. Peer membership identiation is a major
eonometri issue one estimation is not performed with natural experiment
or adho data sets. In this paper it is ahieved onstruting a similarity
index, whih measures the probability of belonging to the same peer for eah
ouple of observations. This formulation allows to rewrite eah budget share
equation as a Spatial Autoregressive model in order to adapt tools taken from
the Spatial Eonometris literature: the endogeneity of mean budget shares
13
Proof of asymptoti properties of OMD estimators an be found in Cameron, Trivedi
[6℄ and in Ferguson [10℄
17
that arises from the reetion problem is takled using a Generalized Spatial
2SLS proedure.
Results support the initial hypothesis that soial interations are relevant
in onsumption alloation. Further on, they suggest a nontrivial role for
visibility of dierent goods.
Future researh should address two open issues whih limit interpretation
of estimation results: rst, in this linearinmeans model pure soial inter-
ation and visibility are not separately identiable. Seond, in the literature
there isn't a model that provides a strutural haraterization of preferene
dependene on soial interations and visibility. Another related eld is the
empirial investigation of an intertemporal onsumption model with soial
interations.
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A Codebook and Desriptive Statistis
Var name Variables desription
ALH aloholi beverages for home use
ALO aloholi beverages at restaurants, bars, afeterias, afes, et
FDO dining out at restaurants, drive-thrus, et, exl. alohol; inl. food at shool
FDH food and nonaloholi beverages at groery, speialty and onveniene stores
CLO lothing and shoes, not inluding underwear, undergarments, and nightwear
UND underwear, undergarments, nightwear and sleeping garments
GAS gasoline and diesel fuel for motor vehiles
OTH Other non durables expenses
CAR the purhase of new and used motor vehiles suh as ars, truks, and vans
JWL jewelry and wathes
HSE rent, or mortgage, or purhase, of their housing;
home furnishings and household items;
homeowners insurane, re insurane, and property insurane
TOTEXP total expenditure
p ALH Aloholi beverages at home prie index
p ALO Aloholi beverages away from home prie index
p FDO Food away from home prie index
p FDH Food at home prie index
p CLO Apparel prie index
p UND Women's apparel (underwear pries are not available 1993-1996) prie index
p GAS Motor fuel prie index
p OTH All items prie index
h ALH log prie ALH-log prie OTH
h ALO log prie ALO-log prie OTH
h FDO log prie FDO-log prie OTH
h FDH log prie FDH-log prie OTH
h CLO log prie CLO-log prie OTH
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Var name Variables desription
h UND log prie UND-log prie OTH
h GAS log prie GAS-log prie OTH
stone
P
{X=ALH,ALO,FDO,FDH,CLO,UND,GAS}X ln(X)
IYEAR 1994 year dummy
IYEAR 1995 year dummy
IYEAR 1996 year dummy
IYEAR 1997 year dummy
IYEAR 1998 year dummy
IYEAR 1999 year dummy
IYEAR 2000 year dummy
IYEAR 2001 year dummy
IYEAR 2002 year dummy
IQTR 2 quarter 2 dummy
IQTR 3 quarter 3 dummy
IQTR 4 quarter 4 dummy
IREGION 2 North Central dummy
IREGION 3 South dummy
IREGION 4 West dummy
IOCCUP1 2 Tehnial, sales, and administrative support oupations dummy
IOCCUP1 3 Servie oupations dummy
IOCCUP1 4 Farming, forestry, and shing oupations dummy
IOCCUP1 5 Preision prodution, raft, and repair oupations dummy
IOCCUP1 6 Operators, fabriators, and laborers dummy
IOCCUP1 7 Armed fores dummy
IOCCUP1 8 Self-employed dummy
IOCCUP1 9 Not working dummy
IOCCUP1 10 Retired dummy
SEX REF Sex of referene person
AGE REF age of referene person
YR EDREF year of eduation referene person
IMARITAL1 2 Widowed dummy
IMARITAL1 3 Divored dummy
IMARITAL1 4 Separated dummy
IMARITAL1 5 Never married dummy
PERSLT18 "Number of hildren less than 18 "
PERSOT64 Number of persons over 64 in CU
IREF RACE 2 Blak
IREF RACE 3 Amerian Indian, Aleut, Eskimo
IREF RACE 4 Asian or Pai Islander
m ALH mean budget share of ALH
m ALO mean budget share of ALO
m FDO mean budget share of FDO
m FDH mean budget share of FDH
m CLO mean budget share of CLO
m UND mean budget share of UND
m GAS mean budget share of GAS
m OTH mean budget share of OTH
lnx logTOTEXP − stone
lnx2 (log TOTEXP − stone)2
Estimation Subsample USwide sample
mean sd min max mean sd
ALH 169.4168 323.9644 0 9689 156.0034 305.6665
ALO 148.1916 349.6133 0 8596 137.3304 328.3154
FDO 1496.894 1924.96 0 54991 1410.301 1766.066
FDH 3946.552 2184.401 0 22452 3787.429 2100.249
CLO 810.556 1061.452 0 33948 801.5828 1021.236
UND 138.5562 199.0201 0 2964 137.63 196.3205
GAS 1176.581 933.4128 0 9270 1172.394 925.0178
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Estimation Subsample USwide sample
mean sd min max mean sd
OTH 2.57E+07 3.96E+07 0 1.06E+09 11044.81 8904.229
CAR 3223.62 7905.023 0 95580 3278.012 8008.563
JWL 168.4439 1900.58 0 210000 148.0257 1271.566
HSE 5398478 1.31E+07 0 5.07E+08 3728.37 4086.647
TOTEXP 28370.56 20634.27 707.9996 743532.3 27190.09 19419.9
p ALH 99.06309 4.604702 90.89744 105.641
p ALO 98.36219 7.944797 82.3299 110.7195
p FDO 98.52624 6.234391 86.00479 107.7153
p FDH 98.59102 5.979608 84.1852 106.0734
p CLO 102.4084 3.366371 93.61198 107.571
p UND 105.9989 5.466155 92.67873 118.8631
p GAS 98.71063 13.41501 74.24512 130.373
p OTH 99.134 6.049358 85.95972 107.4052
h ALH 0.0000973 0.0168857 -0.0223212 0.0579662
h ALO -0.0092608 0.0216242 -0.0502381 0.0312734
h FDO -0.0062909 0.0066385 -0.021008 0.0055633
h FDH -0.0054863 0.008038 -0.0208597 0.0149212
h CLO 0.0338519 0.0876056 -0.1308093 0.2179918
h UND 0.0675184 0.10364 -0.1408286 0.3083668
h GAS -0.0115424 0.1079955 -0.2719941 0.2138472
stone 2.497275 0.7220481 0.0668289 4.423194
IYEAR 1994 0.0697169 0.2546783 0 1 0.0757231 0.2645582
IYEAR 1995 0.0647422 0.2460789 0 1 0.0719397 0.2583916
IYEAR 1996 0.032301 0.1768045 0 1 0.033804 0.1807268
IYEAR 1997 0.1103559 0.3133439 0 1 0.1111995 0.3143833
IYEAR 1998 0.109375 0.3121201 0 1 0.1131186 0.316742
IYEAR 1999 0.1144899 0.3184165 0 1 0.117231 0.3216997
IYEAR 2000 0.1625561 0.3689731 0 1 0.1545716 0.3615008
IYEAR 2001 0.1566704 0.3635025 0 1 0.1515284 0.3585681
IYEAR 2002 0.1619254 0.3683953 0 1 0.1525977 0.3596042
IQTR 2 0.2383688 0.4261008 0 1 0.2442221 0.4296309
IQTR 3 0.2378083 0.425756 0 1 0.2391501 0.4265704
IQTR 4 0.2698991 0.4439227 0 1 0.2744071 0.4462212
IREGION 2 0.1617152 0.3682023 0 1 0.2673338 0.4425741
IREGION 3 0.2397001 0.4269154 0 1 0.33878 0.4733014
IREGION 4 0.3462024 0.4757753 0 1 0.1927622 0.3944733
IOCCUP1 2 0.1403447 0.3473565 0 1 0.1390267 0.3459792
IOCCUP1 3 0.1122478 0.3156821 0 1 0.1133105 0.3169763
IOCCUP1 4 0.0073571 0.0854602 0 1 0.00817 0.0900192
IOCCUP1 5 0.0519198 0.221873 0 1 0.0533242 0.2246822
IOCCUP1 6 0.0818386 0.2741282 0 1 0.0947498 0.2928731
IOCCUP1 7 0.0044142 0.0662952 0 1 0.0032625 0.0570259
IOCCUP1 8 0.0349636 0.183694 0 1 0.0395065 0.1947994
IOCCUP1 9 0.0985846 0.298114 0 1 0.1012474 0.3016602
IOCCUP1 10 0.2282791 0.4197382 0 1 0.2136258 0.4098712
SEX REF 1.430143 0.4951133 1 2 1.432433 0.4954205
AGE REF 51.36848 17.06942 17 94 50.8984 16.92091
YR EDREF 13.82112 2.813901 0 18 13.70314 2.809938
IMARITAL1 2 0.1219871 0.3272824 0 1 0.1206032 0.32567
IMARITAL1 3 0.1340387 0.3407058 0 1 0.1321727 0.3386831
IMARITAL1 4 0.0298487 0.1701756 0 1 0.0279644 0.164873
IMARITAL1 5 0.1387332 0.34568 0 1 0.1363674 0.343183
PERSLT18 0.7101317 1.131586 0 10 0.7067032 1.108377
PERSOT64 0.3805353 0.6572266 0 4 0.3587389 0.6448471
IREF RACE 2 0.1053111 0.3069646 0 1 0.115257 0.3193362
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Estimation Subsample USwide sample
mean sd min max mean sd
IREF RACE 3 0.0058156 0.0760406 0 1 0.007512 0.0863468
IREF RACE 4 0.0557035 0.2293562 0 1 0.0325977 0.1775836
m ALH 0.1526445 0.1480501 0.0002917 0.6559903
m ALO 0.118248 0.1004168 0.000288 0.4505704
m FDO 1.222685 1.146591 0.0045779 5.28772
m FDH 3.911378 3.657658 0.0235374 16.5382
m CLO 0.6206222 0.5814182 0.0016867 2.735063
m UND 0.1158841 0.1091201 0.0003363 0.5074397
m GAS 1.085815 1.054143 0.0055939 4.869476
m OTH 9.659403 8.539694 0.0612457 39.68477
lnx 7.558408 0.9215498 3.685857 11.09327
lnx2 57.97873 14.35368 13.58554 123.0606
B Equationbyequation estimation results
GAS GAS GAS UND UND UND CLO CLO CLO
beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat
m ALH -0.5394 0.0134 -40.14 0.5218 0.0299 17.47 0.2704 0.0265 10.20
m ALO 0.0778 0.0029 26.77 -0.1202 0.0063 -19.04 0.0185 0.0058 3.17
m FDO 0.0070 0.0009 7.44 -0.0073 0.0021 -3.42 -0.0050 0.0018 -2.77
m FDH 0.0994 0.0056 17.77 0.0989 0.0132 7.48 0.3516 0.0452 7.77
m CLO -0.1220 0.0234 -5.22 0.0424 0.0075 5.64 -0.1068 0.0268 -3.98
m UND 0.0196 0.0033 5.88 -0.4177 0.0318 -13.13 -0.0434 0.0057 -7.61
m GAS 0.2967 0.0138 21.45 -0.6437 0.0647 -9.94 -0.1519 0.0105 -14.43
m OTH -0.0167 0.0005 -34.55 0.0133 0.0011 12.46 0.0074 0.0010 7.80
COSTANT 0.3340 0.1766 1.89 -2.8171 0.3459 -8.14 -1.6873 0.4084 -4.13
h ALH -0.0097 0.0453 -0.21 0.0489 0.0885 0.55 -0.0288 0.1050 -0.27
h ALO 0.0692 0.0561 1.23 -0.0696 0.1097 -0.63 -0.2550 0.1300 -1.96
h FDO 0.0502 0.1046 0.48 -0.2224 0.2045 -1.09 0.3154 0.2425 1.30
h FDH -0.0261 0.0449 -0.58 0.1444 0.0879 1.64 0.0119 0.1041 0.11
h CLO 0.0351 0.0310 1.13 -0.0196 0.0607 -0.32 -0.0495 0.0719 -0.69
h UND -0.0075 0.0184 -0.41 -0.0236 0.0359 -0.66 -0.0104 0.0425 -0.25
h GAS 0.0067 0.0050 1.34 0.0011 0.0098 0.11 0.0003 0.0116 0.03
IYEAR 1994 0.0007 0.0016 0.42 -0.0007 0.0032 -0.22 0.0067 0.0038 1.77
IYEAR 1995 0.0017 0.0025 0.68 -0.0028 0.0049 -0.57 0.0030 0.0058 0.52
IYEAR 1996 0.0001 0.0030 0.05 -0.0021 0.0059 -0.35 0.0080 0.0070 1.15
IYEAR 1997 0.0012 0.0031 0.40 -0.0068 0.0061 -1.11 0.0071 0.0072 0.98
IYEAR 1998 -0.0100 0.0034 -2.92 0.0072 0.0067 1.07 0.0143 0.0080 1.80
IYEAR 1999 -0.0110 0.0035 -3.11 0.0074 0.0069 1.08 0.0159 0.0081 1.95
IYEAR 2000 -0.0108 0.0039 -2.79 0.0106 0.0076 1.40 0.0157 0.0090 1.75
IYEAR 2001 -0.0104 0.0046 -2.25 0.0127 0.0090 1.40 0.0148 0.0107 1.39
IYEAR 2002 -0.0104 0.0049 -2.11 0.0111 0.0097 1.15 0.0129 0.0114 1.13
IQTR 2 -0.0008 0.0007 -1.18 0.0008 0.0013 0.59 0.0019 0.0016 1.19
IQTR 3 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.86 0.0018 0.0011 1.62 0.0011 0.0013 0.80
IQTR 4 -0.0010 0.0006 -1.57 0.0036 0.0013 2.85 0.0013 0.0015 0.88
SEX REF 0.0008 0.0003 2.30 -0.0014 0.0006 -2.12 -0.0082 0.0008 -10.61
IREGION 2 -0.0228 0.0008 -27.15 0.0272 0.0018 15.10 0.0203 0.0017 11.70
IREGION 3 -0.0047 0.0007 -6.71 0.0074 0.0015 5.03 0.0046 0.0015 3.09
IREGION 4 -0.0048 0.0007 -6.53 0.0195 0.0015 12.60 0.0009 0.0015 0.58
IOCCUP1 2 0.0000 0.0005 0.08 0.0011 0.0010 1.12 -0.0048 0.0012 -3.92
IOCCUP1 3 -0.0007 0.0006 -1.19 0.0053 0.0011 4.93 -0.0096 0.0013 -7.48
IOCCUP1 4 0.0008 0.0017 0.47 0.0126 0.0034 3.71 -0.0026 0.0040 -0.65
IOCCUP1 5 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.36 0.0111 0.0014 7.87 -0.0061 0.0017 -3.65
IOCCUP1 6 0.0001 0.0006 0.08 0.0106 0.0012 8.47 -0.0079 0.0015 -5.37
IOCCUP1 7 0.0005 0.0022 0.23 0.0086 0.0043 2.00 0.0026 0.0051 0.52
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GAS GAS GAS UND UND UND CLO CLO CLO
beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat
IOCCUP1 8 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.47 0.0034 0.0016 2.10 -0.0077 0.0019 -4.01
IOCCUP1 9 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.20 -0.0020 0.0011 -1.74 -0.0120 0.0013 -8.86
IOCCUP1 10 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.49 0.0078 0.0013 5.89 -0.0024 0.0016 -1.53
AGE REF 0.0038 0.0016 2.45 -0.0051 0.0031 -1.66 -0.0088 0.0036 -2.42
YR EDREF -0.0096 0.0062 -1.55 0.0062 0.0121 0.52 0.0168 0.0143 1.17
IMARITAL1 2 0.0107 0.0009 11.85 -0.0013 0.0018 -0.73 -0.0020 0.0021 -0.99
IMARITAL1 3 0.0080 0.0007 11.78 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.26 -0.0013 0.0015 -0.84
IMARITAL1 4 0.0078 0.0010 7.74 -0.0012 0.0020 -0.63 -0.0007 0.0023 -0.29
IMARITAL1 5 0.0092 0.0008 11.13 -0.0020 0.0016 -1.24 0.0037 0.0019 1.98
PERSLT18 0.0199 0.0181 1.10 -0.0826 0.0354 -2.33 -0.0655 0.0419 -1.56
PERSOT64 -0.0840 0.0424 -1.98 0.0007 0.0830 0.01 0.0671 0.0982 0.68
IREF RACE 2 0.0079 0.0006 13.19 -0.0179 0.0012 -14.84 -0.0162 0.0013 -12.15
IREF RACE 3 0.0099 0.0020 5.01 -0.0180 0.0039 -4.65 -0.0256 0.0046 -5.62
IREF RACE 4 -0.0013 0.0008 -1.53 0.0003 0.0017 0.19 0.0043 0.0018 2.33
lnx -0.0894 0.0464 -1.92 0.7848 0.0909 8.63 0.4747 0.1074 4.42
it lnx AGE -0.0010 0.0004 -2.45 0.0012 0.0008 1.53 0.0021 0.0009 2.25
it lnx LT18 -0.0043 0.0046 -0.93 0.0200 0.0091 2.20 0.0134 0.0107 1.25
it lnx OT64 0.0214 0.0109 1.96 -0.0031 0.0213 -0.14 -0.0195 0.0253 -0.77
it lnx EDU 0.0025 0.0016 1.53 -0.0020 0.0031 -0.65 -0.0032 0.0037 -0.85
lnx2 0.0057 0.0030 1.89 -0.0524 0.0059 -8.83 -0.0319 0.0070 -4.56
it lnx2 AGE 0.0001 0.0000 2.40 -0.0001 0.0001 -1.40 -0.0001 0.0001 -2.05
it lnx2 LT18 0.0002 0.0003 0.82 -0.0012 0.0006 -2.13 -0.0007 0.0007 -1.01
it lnx2 OT64 -0.0013 0.0007 -1.90 0.0003 0.0014 0.20 0.0013 0.0016 0.80
it lnx2 EDU -0.0001 0.0001 -1.45 0.0001 0.0002 0.67 0.0001 0.0002 0.60
CAR -0.0213 0.0124 -1.72 0.1940 0.0243 7.99 0.1371 0.0287 4.78
JWL 0.0196 0.0127 1.55 -0.0349 0.0247 -1.41 0.2166 0.0293 7.38
HSE 0.0095 0.0034 2.79 -0.0752 0.0067 -11.29 -0.0508 0.0079 -6.46
ρ 0.0244 0.02954 0.01706
σ2ǫ 0.0007 0.00004 0.00046
FDH FDH FDH FDO FDO FDO
beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat
m ALH -0.0420 0.0577 -0.73 -0.3301 0.0184 -17.91
m ALO -0.0295 0.0124 -2.38 0.0056 0.0013 4.34
m FDO 0.0362 0.0244 1.48 0.1657 0.0190 8.71
m FDH 0.0819 0.0599 1.37 0.1247 0.0076 16.34
m CLO -0.3162 0.1007 -3.14 -0.0990 0.0320 -3.09
m UND -0.0073 0.0139 -0.53 0.0253 0.0043 5.83
m GAS 0.0325 0.0041 7.87 0.0152 0.0042 3.60
m OTH -0.0086 0.0021 -4.14 -0.0120 0.0007 -17.82
COSTANT -4.4741 0.7302 -6.13 -0.8036 0.2471 -3.25
h ALH -0.1158 0.1872 -0.62 -0.0740 0.0634 -1.17
h ALO 0.2204 0.2318 0.95 -0.0354 0.0785 -0.45
h FDO -0.8672 0.4324 -2.01 0.3020 0.1464 2.06
h FDH 0.1574 0.1857 0.85 -0.0054 0.0629 -0.09
h CLO -0.0293 0.1282 -0.23 -0.0246 0.0434 -0.57
h UND -0.0671 0.0758 -0.89 0.0205 0.0257 0.80
h GAS -0.0331 0.0206 -1.60 0.0103 0.0070 1.47
IYEAR 1994 -0.0047 0.0067 -0.70 0.0016 0.0023 0.70
IYEAR 1995 -0.0149 0.0104 -1.43 0.0018 0.0035 0.51
IYEAR 1996 -0.0235 0.0124 -1.89 0.0012 0.0042 0.29
IYEAR 1997 -0.0344 0.0128 -2.68 0.0004 0.0044 0.10
IYEAR 1998 -0.0280 0.0142 -1.97 -0.0061 0.0048 -1.27
IYEAR 1999 -0.0220 0.0146 -1.51 -0.0070 0.0049 -1.42
IYEAR 2000 -0.0291 0.0160 -1.82 -0.0078 0.0054 -1.44
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FDH FDH FDH FDO FDO FDO
beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat
IYEAR 2001 -0.0392 0.0191 -2.05 -0.0102 0.0065 -1.58
IYEAR 2002 -0.0409 0.0204 -2.00 -0.0120 0.0069 -1.75
IQTR 2 0.0050 0.0028 1.78 -0.0006 0.0009 -0.69
IQTR 3 0.0026 0.0024 1.10 0.0002 0.0008 0.28
IQTR 4 0.0036 0.0027 1.36 -0.0015 0.0009 -1.68
SEX REF 0.0037 0.0014 2.67 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.44
IREGION 2 0.0044 0.0036 1.24 -0.0130 0.0012 -11.17
IREGION 3 -0.0064 0.0030 -2.17 -0.0038 0.0010 -3.86
IREGION 4 0.0072 0.0031 2.32 -0.0027 0.0010 -2.67
IOCCUP1 2 -0.0035 0.0022 -1.62 -0.0025 0.0007 -3.44
IOCCUP1 3 0.0124 0.0023 5.45 -0.0054 0.0008 -6.93
IOCCUP1 4 0.0348 0.0072 4.86 -0.0024 0.0024 -0.97
IOCCUP1 5 0.0121 0.0030 4.07 -0.0035 0.0010 -3.50
IOCCUP1 6 0.0097 0.0026 3.66 -0.0035 0.0009 -3.91
IOCCUP1 7 0.0053 0.0090 0.59 -0.0006 0.0031 -0.18
IOCCUP1 8 0.0003 0.0034 0.09 -0.0021 0.0012 -1.77
IOCCUP1 9 0.0360 0.0024 14.96 -0.0053 0.0008 -6.54
IOCCUP1 10 0.0146 0.0028 5.22 -0.0028 0.0009 -3.00
AGE REF -0.0007 0.0065 -0.11 -0.0011 0.0022 -0.48
YR EDREF 0.0495 0.0256 1.94 0.0025 0.0086 0.28
IMARITAL1 2 -0.0055 0.0037 -1.49 0.0097 0.0013 7.75
IMARITAL1 3 -0.0021 0.0028 -0.76 0.0071 0.0009 7.52
IMARITAL1 4 0.0107 0.0042 2.55 0.0089 0.0014 6.30
IMARITAL1 5 0.0090 0.0034 2.62 0.0100 0.0012 8.64
PERSLT18 0.3011 0.0748 4.02 0.0928 0.0253 3.66
PERSOT64 -0.0712 0.1753 -0.41 -0.0321 0.0594 -0.54
IREF RACE 2 0.0083 0.0025 3.33 0.0075 0.0008 9.04
IREF RACE 3 -0.0079 0.0082 -0.97 -0.0013 0.0028 -0.48
IREF RACE 4 0.0140 0.0035 4.05 -0.0003 0.0012 -0.22
lnx 1.3148 0.1920 6.85 0.2245 0.0650 3.45
it lnx AGE 0.0004 0.0017 0.26 0.0002 0.0006 0.37
it lnx LT18 -0.0658 0.0192 -3.43 -0.0210 0.0065 -3.24
it lnx OT64 0.0166 0.0451 0.37 0.0080 0.0153 0.52
it lnx EDU -0.0165 0.0066 -2.50 -0.0005 0.0022 -0.22
lnx2 -0.0913 0.0125 -7.28 -0.0152 0.0042 -3.57
it lnx2 AGE 0.0000 0.0001 -0.30 0.0000 0.0000 -0.26
it lnx2 LT18 0.0038 0.0012 3.11 0.0012 0.0004 2.94
it lnx2 OT64 -0.0010 0.0029 -0.34 -0.0005 0.0010 -0.52
it lnx2 EDU 0.0012 0.0004 2.87 0.0000 0.0001 0.22
CAR 0.3560 0.0513 6.94 0.0518 0.0174 2.98
JWL -0.1879 0.0523 -3.59 0.1986 0.0177 11.21
HSE 0.0581 0.0141 4.13 -0.0189 0.0048 -3.96
ρ 0.02617 0.02373
σ2ǫ 0.00491 0.00148
ALO ALO ALO ALH ALH ALH
beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat
m ALH 0.0009 0.0017 0.51 -0.0050 0.0082 -0.61
m ALO -0.0244 0.0084 -2.90 0.0019 0.0017 1.12
m FDO 0.0011 0.0005 2.04 0.0000 0.0005 -0.09
m FDH 0.0022 0.0030 0.75 0.0025 0.0029 0.86
m CLO -0.0157 0.0131 -1.20 -0.0295 0.0130 -2.27
m UND -0.0019 0.0017 -1.09 -0.0025 0.0017 -1.51
m GAS 0.0649 0.0091 7.17 0.0409 0.0097 4.22
m OTH -0.0006 0.0003 -2.21 -0.0003 0.0003 -1.19
COSTANT 0.0872 0.1196 0.73 -0.2467 0.1161 -2.12
h ALH -0.0656 0.0307 -2.14 -0.0275 0.0298 -0.92
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ALO ALO ALO ALH ALH ALH
beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat
h ALO 0.0555 0.0381 1.46 -0.0471 0.0369 -1.28
h FDO 0.0048 0.0710 0.07 0.0330 0.0689 0.48
h FDH 0.0738 0.0305 2.42 0.0014 0.0296 0.05
h CLO 0.0100 0.0210 0.48 -0.0137 0.0204 -0.67
h UND 0.0129 0.0125 1.04 -0.0049 0.0121 -0.41
h GAS 0.0057 0.0034 1.69 -0.0017 0.0033 -0.51
IYEAR 1994 0.0004 0.0011 0.34 0.0004 0.0011 0.39
IYEAR 1995 -0.0008 0.0017 -0.45 -0.0007 0.0017 -0.40
IYEAR 1996 -0.0008 0.0020 -0.39 -0.0005 0.0020 -0.25
IYEAR 1997 -0.0006 0.0021 -0.28 -0.0012 0.0020 -0.57
IYEAR 1998 -0.0010 0.0023 -0.44 -0.0015 0.0023 -0.68
IYEAR 1999 -0.0011 0.0024 -0.46 -0.0018 0.0023 -0.76
IYEAR 2000 -0.0007 0.0026 -0.28 -0.0015 0.0026 -0.59
IYEAR 2001 -0.0004 0.0031 -0.14 -0.0029 0.0030 -0.96
IYEAR 2002 0.0008 0.0033 0.25 -0.0022 0.0032 -0.69
IQTR 2 -0.0010 0.0005 -2.20 0.0006 0.0004 1.38
IQTR 3 0.0003 0.0004 0.67 0.0001 0.0004 0.38
IQTR 4 -0.0015 0.0004 -3.35 0.0004 0.0004 0.96
SEX REF -0.0026 0.0002 -11.66 -0.0029 0.0002 -13.10
IREGION 2 -0.0010 0.0005 -2.02 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.52
IREGION 3 0.0005 0.0004 1.11 0.0001 0.0004 0.16
IREGION 4 0.0002 0.0005 0.47 0.0009 0.0005 1.87
IOCCUP1 2 -0.0009 0.0004 -2.55 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.76
IOCCUP1 3 -0.0008 0.0004 -2.23 0.0002 0.0004 0.57
IOCCUP1 4 -0.0022 0.0012 -1.84 0.0048 0.0011 4.19
IOCCUP1 5 -0.0007 0.0005 -1.49 0.0009 0.0005 1.90
IOCCUP1 6 -0.0013 0.0004 -3.00 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.50
IOCCUP1 7 0.0006 0.0015 0.39 -0.0004 0.0014 -0.30
IOCCUP1 8 -0.0018 0.0006 -3.11 -0.0013 0.0005 -2.30
IOCCUP1 9 -0.0018 0.0004 -4.63 0.0003 0.0004 0.73
IOCCUP1 10 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.83 0.0012 0.0004 2.77
AGE REF -0.0023 0.0011 -2.21 -0.0021 0.0010 -2.02
YR EDREF -0.0008 0.0042 -0.20 0.0067 0.0041 1.64
IMARITAL1 2 0.0015 0.0006 2.42 0.0015 0.0006 2.61
IMARITAL1 3 0.0018 0.0005 3.96 0.0018 0.0004 4.12
IMARITAL1 4 0.0021 0.0007 3.10 0.0021 0.0007 3.24
IMARITAL1 5 0.0036 0.0006 6.48 0.0022 0.0005 4.02
PERSLT18 -0.0431 0.0123 -3.51 -0.0166 0.0119 -1.40
PERSOT64 -0.0143 0.0288 -0.50 -0.0015 0.0279 -0.05
IREF RACE 2 -0.0023 0.0004 -5.99 -0.0011 0.0004 -2.87
IREF RACE 3 -0.0034 0.0013 -2.57 -0.0016 0.0013 -1.21
IREF RACE 4 -0.0018 0.0005 -3.33 -0.0018 0.0005 -3.41
lnx -0.0123 0.0314 -0.39 0.0751 0.0305 2.46
it lnx AGE 0.0005 0.0003 1.85 0.0005 0.0003 1.77
it lnx LT18 0.0097 0.0031 3.07 0.0034 0.0031 1.12
it lnx OT64 0.0036 0.0074 0.49 0.0001 0.0072 0.02
it lnx EDU 0.0003 0.0011 0.29 -0.0017 0.0011 -1.62
lnx2 0.0003 0.0021 0.15 -0.0053 0.0020 -2.67
it lnx2 AGE 0.0000 0.0000 -1.59 0.0000 0.0000 -1.58
it lnx2 LT18 -0.0005 0.0002 -2.72 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.90
it lnx2 OT64 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.49 0.0000 0.0005 0.00
it lnx2 EDU 0.0000 0.0001 -0.34 0.0001 0.0001 1.59
CAR 0.0142 0.0084 1.69 0.0279 0.0082 3.42
JWL 0.0258 0.0086 3.01 0.0255 0.0083 3.05
HSE 0.0008 0.0023 0.35 0.0016 0.0022 0.71
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ALO ALO ALO ALH ALH ALH
beta std.err t-stat beta std.err t-stat
ρ 0.01800 0.01848
σ2ǫ 0.00013 0.00012
C OMD estimates of pries' parameters
ALH ALO FDO FDH CLO UND GAS
ALH -0.427
(0.91)
ALO 0.311** -0.021
(0.14) (0.79)
FDO 0.256** 0.022 0.113
(0.06) (0.05) (1.76)
FDH -0.019 -0.041 -0.112 0.121
(0.33) (0.25) (0.53) (5.53)
CLO -0.249 0.035 -0.018 -0.063 -0.039
(1.37) (0.62) (0.2) (3.99) (2.74)
UND 0.061 -0.132 -0.141 0.033 -0.089 0.040
(0.2) (0.18) (0.19) (0.76) (0.48) (2.86)
GAS 0.251 -0.606* 0.356** 0.023 -0.451 -0.006 0.064
(0.92) (0.32) (0.11) (0.3) (0.95) (0.36) (1.45)
std errors in parenthesis. * denotes 10% signiane level, ** 5%
χ2 speiation test: 40143.76 [d.f. = 21℄
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